By Dr Marco Annunziata
ISBN-10: 0230346650
ISBN-13: 9780230346659
ISBN-10: 1349328626
ISBN-13: 9781349328628
In the course of the instruments of economics, Annunziata's bright and gripping booklet exhibits how the worldwide monetary drawback used to be attributable to a failure of management and customary feel during which all of us performed a job. The insights of this transparent and compelling research are crucial for studying the proper classes from the challenge, and seeing new threats round the nook.
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Additional info for The Economics of the Financial Crisis: Lessons and New Threats
Example text
This could be done not only with residential mortgages (RMBS) and mortgages on commercial properties (CMBS), but also with loans to corporates and with pretty much any other financial claim. The new financial products could be “structured” in various ways, starting from the “underlying” assets, defining the claim on the stream of expected revenue from the underlying asset to create various combinations of expected returns and risks. At the height of the financial crisis, securitization had become virtually a swearword, but securitization did, and still does, bring important value.
The incentive also worked in a negative way: every bank desperately wanted to avoid doing anything that might be interpreted as a signal of financial weakness. This made the immediate policy response more complicated and less effective. As a first line of defense, central banks opened the spigots and started to supply liquidity in abundance, beginning with very short-term liquidity. S. the Fed started to relax its collateral rules and encouraged banks to take up liquidity at its discount window.
These anomalies included: short-term momentum (prices react only slowly and gradually to new information); long-run return reversals (mean reversion over longer horizons of six to ten years, seen as supporting contrarian strategies); size effects (small caps outperforming large caps over long periods); seasonal and day of the week effects. Some of these anomalies are well-known to market participants, handed down from generation to generation in useful tidbits of popular wisdom such as “The trend is your friend,” “Sell in May and go away,” and so forth.
The Economics of the Financial Crisis: Lessons and New Threats by Dr Marco Annunziata
by Anthony
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