Read e-book online Language, Thought and Reference PDF

By George Powell

ISBN-10: 0230227953

ISBN-13: 9780230227958

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The meaningfulness of empty names thus seems to constitute another fundamental challenge to the Millian position. 3 Rigidity While data on co-reference and emptiness seem to weigh against any account of the semantics of proper names along Millian lines, data on rigidity seem to weigh against any account along non-Millian lines. The key intuitions on rigidity concern a comparison between the behaviour of different expression types in modal contexts. There are different ways of getting at these intuitions on modal profile: imagine (if you need to) that in the actual world Louis Armstrong is (leaving tense to one side) the greatest jazz trumpeter.

After all, it’s open to the minimal semanticist to design a theory on which each sentence of a natural language is assigned a truth condition which is fully determined by the semantic values assigned to its component expressions plus syntax. If that’s all that’s going on, then the contextualist should have no problem with it. But that isn’t the (only) game most minimal semanticists take themselves to be playing. Most make two key claims for their theories: firstly, that they constitute one component of a more general theory of interpretation, and secondly that they are answerable to at least some data on speaker intuition.

Nevertheless, something needs to give: as things stand, I’m suggesting that the meaning of a proper name points the hearer towards a concept of something the speaker believes to bear the name. And that’s not what’s going on here. Perhaps we should look a bit more closely at what it means for an individual concept to contain the information x is F. So far, I’ve been assuming that if you put x is F inside an individual concept it’s because you believe whatever the concept picks out to be F. But surely there are other ways x is F can get inside an individual concept: you may doubt that x is F, you may hope that x is F, you may believe that someone else believes that x is F and so on.

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Language, Thought and Reference by George Powell


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