Zahavi, Dan; Siderits, Mark; Thompson, Evan's Self, no self? : perspectives from analytical, PDF

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Extra info for Self, no self? : perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions

Example text

But Fasching is cognizant of the danger for a non-substantialist in such an appeal—that it suggests the self is a separately existing entity. He believes that the Advaitin can avoid this trap by refusing to separate the presencing that is the mode of being of each experience and the content of the experience. He takes this to be the point of the Advaitin insistence that the self is neither an object of experience nor the subject of experience, but somehow transcends both. Careful phenomenological investigation of the mode of givenness of experience can, he thinks, help us make sense of this.

Nevertheless, neonate imitation research indicates that a minimal sort of self-experience, the sense of being a unified, embodied perspective on the world, is present from birth. At this point, there are several potential responses that defenders of NCA might offer. Schechtman, for example, concedes a conceptual distinction between self and person but argues that narratives are nonetheless central to both categories (Schechtman 2007: 171). In order to constitute oneself as a narrative person, ‘one must recognize oneself as continuing, see past actions and experiences as having implications for one’s current rights and responsibilities, and recognize a future that will be impacted by the past and present’ (Schechtman 2007: 170).

And each act of cognition thus has this aspect of subjectivity. Additionally, the sense of being a self with a temporally extended, historically constituted identity (aham Á ka¯ra) is also real. But to infer that subjectivity (svasam Á vedana) entails the real existence of a stable phenomenal self, or to infer that aham Á ka¯ra refers to a permanent, stable historical self, is a mistake. This mistake arises, Dharmakı¯rti argues, from our tendency to reify the sense of self central to the phenomenal character of consciousness.

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