Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard's Williamson on Knowledge PDF

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Sample text

However, we should note that Williamson’s argumentative strategy in relation to M3 is part of his broader one of persuasion. He develops a package of complementary theses incompatible with M3. His idea is to undermine the motivation and rationale for M3 by, as it were, progressively isolating it. Regarding knowing specifically, Williamson seeks to show that this factive state satisfies all the other, well-motivated marks of the mental; so that refusing knowing the status of a fully mental state on the grounds that it is not internal looks less and less attractive, the proponent of Internalism increasingly dogmatic and ungrounded.

For example, one way of dissipating the alleged obstacle would be to insist on a distinction between what is necessary for seeing that it is raining and what is necessary for knowing that one sees that it is raining. With this distinction in place, we can argue that being able to eliminate the possibility that one is dreaming is only necessary for knowing that one sees that it is raining rather than for seeing that it is raining. This is an obstacle-dissipating supplement to the Means Response, and the present suggestion is that this response will not be philosophically satisfying unless it is supplemented in this way.

As Austin (1979: 77) remarks, ‘‘when we make an assertion such as ‘There is a goldfinch in the garden’ or ‘He is angry’, there is a sense in which we imply that we are sure of it or know it . . ’’ Austin goes on to make several very useful points about (2). 26 Quassim Cassam At this point, however, we run into the following difficulty: a satisfactory answer to (H), as this question is usually understood, will need to explain how S came to know that A—that is, how S acquired this piece of knowledge.

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